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Abstract
Several approaches of structuring (factorization, decomposition)
of Dempster-Shafer joint belief functions from literature are reviewed
with special emphasis on their capability to capture independence
from the point of view of the claim that belief functions generalize
bayes notion of probability. It is demonstrated that Zhu and Lee’s
[12] logical networks and Smets’ [11] directed acyclic graphs are unable
to capture statistical dependence/independence of bayesian networks
[5]. On the other hand, though Shenoy and Shafer’s hypergraphs can
explicitly represent bayesian network factorization of bayesian belief
functions, they disclaim any need for representation of independence
of variables in belief functions. Cano et al. [1] reject the hypergraph
representation of Shenoy and Shafer just on grounds of missing rep-
resentation of variable independence, but in their frameworks some
belief functions factorizable in Shenoy/Shafer framework cannot be
factored. The approach in [4] on the other hand combines the mer-
its of both Cano et al. and of Shenoy/Shafer approach in that for
STRUCTURE OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 2
Shenoy/Shafer approach no simpler factorization than that in [4] ap-
proach exists and on the other hand all independences among variables
captured in Cano et al. framework and many more are captured in
[4] approach.
1 Introduction
The Dempster-Shafer Theory or the Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE)
[6], [2] shows one of possible ways of application of mathematical probability
for subjective evaluation and is intended to be a generalization of bayesian
theory of subjective probability [8]. Belief functions are deemed to gen-
eralize (finite discrete) probability functions in that belief functions assign
basic belief mass to (non-empty) subsets of set of elementary events, whereas
probability functions assign basic belief mass only to elementary events. It
is frequently claimed that, though they comprise something more than just
probabilistic uncertainty, MTE belief function behavior reduces to behavior
of probability if probabilities are available [11]. That is if a belief function
assigns non-zero basic belief mass only to subsets of cardinality 1 of the set
of elementary events, then it is called bayesian belief function and considered
as equivalent to probability function.
A known method of representation of joint probability distribution in
(many) discrete variables are so-called bayesian networks (as described e.g.
in [5], [3]). The joint probability distribution Pr(x1, ..., xn) in variables
X1, X2, ..., Xn, where for a node Xi only variables with indices from the set
pi(i) directly influence the value of Xi, is expressed as:
Pr(x1, ..., xn) =
n∏
i=1
Pr(xi|xpi(i))
It is assumed that if we form a directed graph with nodes representing vari-
ables and directed edges are (all and only) of the form (Xk− > Xi) with
k ∈ pi(i) then this graph is acyclic.As a direct representation of a joint prob-
ability distribution in 15 discrete variables, with a domain with cardinality
four each, would require more than 1 000 000 000 storage cells, bayesian
network representation will immensely contribute to reduction of storage re-
quirement if every variable is directly influenced by only a few other. Beside
this, however, they are known to represent qualitatively many (conditional)
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independences among variables as well as to capture (a part of) causal rela-
tions among variables.
Structuring is much more urgently needed for belief functions. If we have
a MTE belief distribution in 3 discrete variables, each with a domain of
cardinality 4, then the joint belief distribution will be non-zero for possibly
24
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− 1 > 10 000 000 000 000 000 000 points ! A much more elaborated
handling of structure of a joint belief distribution may be needed, but let us
restrict ourselves to the modest requirement to structure at least as good as
bayesian networks do for probability.
Several concepts of structuring belief functions have been proposed. Shenoy
and Shafer [9] have proposed factorizations of belief functions along hyper-
graphs. Smets [11] and Cano at al. [1] proposed factorization of belief func-
tion along directed acyclic graphs (Both proposals are radically different,
nonetheless). Zhu and Lee [12] proposed amendment of a logical network
connectives with specialized belief functions. Still another type of belief net-
work, based on directed acyclic graphs, has been proposed in [4].
Within this paper, let us look at these proposals from the point of view
of the benchmark established by bayesian networks. Especially we will ask
whether or not these proposals cover structuring of probability distributions
into a bayesian network and whether they are capable of expressing depen-
dence independence relations among variables, especially for special case of
probability distribution.
Basic definitions from the MTE are given in Appendix.
2 Logical Networks of Zhu and Lee
Zhu and Lee [12] propose representation of a knowledge base (thus the joint
belief) as a set of rules (and facts) amended by MTE-styled truth probability
intervals. Though a name ”logical network” is never used in their paper, it is
clearly an intention of the authors to have one as they consider forward and
backward propagation for each type of basic logical connector (negation, and,
or, material implication). For a rule r : A→ B its probability interval would
be [rL, rU ]. This implies immediately m(A ∨ B) = rL, m(A ∧ B) = 1 − rU ,
m(X) = rU − rL, where X={true,false} is the logical universe considered in
the paper. The authors claim the necessity of permanent search for common
frame of discernment for combined rules and facts to be major disadvantage
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of general MTE framework. Therefore they seek a way around by restricting
themselves to logical values of rules and facts. They derive formulas for
forward and backward propagation of uncertainty as well as for combination
of evidence.
On page 347 they propose e.g. the following ”Modus Ponens”:
A→ B :: [rL, rU ]
A : [aL, aU ]
B :: [bL, bU ]
with
bL = min{1,max{0, (rL + aU − 1)/aU}}
bU = min{1,max{0, [rU + aU − aL(rL + aU − 1)/aU − 1]/(aU − aL)}}
One could feel impressed by the simplicity of this and other formulas
if not the way they are derived. On page 345 we find the table for joint
belief distribution of A and B (Table II, proposed conjunction procedure for
A ∧ B)):
B
A {t},bL {f},1− bU {t,f},bU − bL
{t},aL {t},m11 {f},m12 {t},m13
A {f},1− aU {f},m21 {f},m22 {f},m23
{t,f},aU − aL {t},m31 {f},m32 {t,f},m33
Out of this table the basic belief assignment for implication is (presum-
ably) derived as follows:
mA→B({true}) = rL = m11 +m21 +m22 +m23 +m31
mA→B({false}) = 1− rU = m12 +m13 +m32
mA→B({true, false}) = rU − rL = m33
Up to this point one can little complain (beside e.g. typing error in
{f}column header of B). But subsequently authors assume independence(!)
of A and B, just: m11 = aLbL, m12 = aL(1 − bU), m13 = aL(bU − bL),
m21 = (1 − aU)bL, m22 = (1 − aU)(1 − bU), m23 = (1 − aU)(bU − bL),
m31 = (aU − aL)bL, m32 = (aU − aL)(1− bU), m33 = (aU − aL)(bU − bL),
Hence
mA→B({true}) = aLbL+(1−aU)bL+(1−aU )(1−bU)+(1−aU)(bU−bL)+(aU−aL)bL =
STRUCTURE OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 5
= aLbL + aL(bU − bL) + (1− aU) + (aU − aL)bL =
= aLbL + 1− aU + aUbL − aLbL =
= aLbL + 1− aU + aUbL − aLbL =
= 1− aU + aUbL = rL
In a similar way we obtain an expression for
mA→B({true, false}) = (aU − aL) · (bU − bL) =
= aU · bU − aU · bL − aL · bU + aL · bL =
= rU − rL
Hence
rU = aUbU − aUbL − aLbU + aLbL + 1− aU + aUbL =
= aUbU − aLbU + aLbL + 1− aU
These are the formulas for [rL, rU interval of a rule R as presented on
page 346. Equations for rL, rU are solved to obtain bL and bU as given at the
beginning of this section. Let us assume that logical formulas A and B have
the following joint distribution of probability of truth:
B
A {t},bL = 0.3 {f},1− bU = 0.7 {t,f},bU − bL = 0
{t},aL = 0.4 0.1 0.3 0
A {f},1− aU = 0.6 0.2 0.4 0
{t,f},aU − aL = 0 0 0 0
Hence aL = aU = 0.4 and bL = bU = 0.3. So rL = 1−0.4+0.3 ·0.4 = 0.48
and rU = 0.4 · 0.3− 0.4 · 0.3 + 0.4 · 0.3 + 1− 0.4 = 0.48.
Let us assume we know from somewhere that A is true nearly for sure
that is that probability of truth of A is aL = 0.999, aU = 1. Then from Zhu
and Lee formulas follows:
bL = min{1,max{0, (0.48 + 1− 1)/1}} = 0.48
bU = min{1,max{0, [0.48 + 1− 0.999(0.48 + 1− 1)/1− 1]/(1− 0.999)}} =
= min{1,max{0, [0.48 + 0.999 · 0.48]/(1− 0.999)}} = 0.48
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But if we look at the data then is is clear that the probability of truth of
B given truth of A is 0.25 and given the narrow uncertainty bound on truth
of A the conditional (obtained by Jeffrey’s rule) will not exceed 0.26.
This example demonstrates in a clear way that the interpretation of DST
proposed in [12] in no way supports the generally expressed claim that DST
can capture bayesian reasoning as a special case. Also the source of the bug
is obvious. If one assumes a priori the independence of facts and hypotheses
(both in bayesian and DST sense) then one shall not wonder that the rule of
inference tells nothing meaningful about the relationship between variables
considered.
3 Directed Acyclic Graphs of Smets
In his paper [11] Smets attempts to generalize the bayesian theorem (being
foundation of probability propagation in bayesian networks, e.g. [5]) in such
a way as to enable propagation of beliefs in a directed networks. For this
purpose he introduces a special notion of conditional beliefs (page 6)
bel(B
:
:
A) = bel(B ∪A)− bel(A) ∀B ⊆ Ω
Ω - set of all elementary events.
On page 5 he states that bel(∅) = 0. Let x be a subset of the set
X, θ a subset of the set Θ. Then on page 8 he states that plX(x
:
:
θ) =
plX×Θ(cyl(x)
:
:
cyl(θ)). On page 9 he writes that pl(A) = bel(Ω) − bel(A).
Though not explicitly stated, we expect that also plX(A
:
:
θ) = belX(X
:
:
θ) −
belX(x
:
:
θ) should hold. So
bel(B
:
:
A) = bel(B ∪ A)− bel(A)
bel(Ω
:
:
A) = bel(Ω ∪A)− bel(A)
Hence
bel(Ω
:
:
A)− bel(B
:
:
A) = bel(Ω ∪A)− bel(A)− bel(B ∪A) + bel(A) =
= bel(Ω) − bel(B ∪A) =
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= pl(B ∪ A) = pl(B ∩ A) = pl(B
:
:
A)
Hence
plX(x
:
:
θ) = plX×Θ(cyl(x)
:
:
cyl(θ)) = belX×Θ(cyl(X)
:
:
cyl(θ))−belX×Θ(cyl(x)
:
:
cyl(θ))
But then we easily derive that belX(x
:
:
θ) = belX×Θ(cyl(x)
:
:
cyl(θ)).
He gives also the formula that given two belief distributions bel1, bel2 and
bel12 = bel1 ©∧bel2 (©∧ is a version of ⊕ which is not normalized) we have
m12(A) =
∑
B⊆Ω
m1(A
:
:
B)m2(B)
.On page 12 he defines that two variables X and Y are said to be independent
iff
belX(A
:
:
y) = belX(A
:
:
y′), ∀A ⊆ X, ∀y, y′ ∈ Y, y 6= y′
and
belY (B
:
:
x) = belY (B
:
:
x′), ∀B ⊆ Y, ∀x, x′ ∈ X, x 6= x′
Furthermore, for the set (of contexts) Θ = {θi, i = 1, . . . , n} he defines that
when two observations are independent whatever the context θi, then they
are called conditionally independent.
Then on page 16 he requires that there is a belΘ(.
:
:
x, y) such that
belΘ(.
:
:
x, y) = belΘ(.
:
:
x)©∧belΘ(.
:
:
y)
Let us consider the consequences. Let X, and Y be sets {xp, xq} and
{yp, yq} resp. Let belX×Y be a bayesian belief distribution, that is mX×Y (A)
greater than zero for some A ⊆ X × Y with card(A)=1 (singletons) and
elsewhere equal zero.
Let be given the following distribution - basic belief assignment
Y
X {yp} {yq}
X {xp} mpp mpq
{xq} mqp mqq
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Under which conditions are X and Y ”cognitively independent” ? Smets
requires that belX(xp
:
:
yp) = belX(xp
:
:
yq), belX(xq
:
:
yp) = belX(xq
:
:
yq), belY (yp
:
:
xp) =
belY (yp
:
:
xq), belY (yq
:
:
xp) = belY (yq
:
:
xq),
Following Smets’ notation cyl(x) shall denote cylindric (vacuous) exten-
sion of set x. Now
belX(xp
:
:
yp) = belX×Θ(cyl(xp)
:
:
cyl(yp)) =
= belX×Θ(cyl(xp) ∪ cyl(yp))− belX×Θ(cyl(yp)) =
= (mpp +mpq +mqq)− (mpq +mqq) = mpp
,
belX(xp
:
:
yq) = mpq, belX(xq
:
:
yp) = mqp, belX(xq
:
:
yq) = mqq, belY (yp
:
:
xp) =
mpp, belY (yp
:
:
xq) = mqp, belY (yq
:
:
xp) = mpq, belY (yq
:
:
xq) = mqq. But belX(xp
:
:
yp) =
belX(xp
:
:
yq) implies mpp = mpq. belX(xq
:
:
yp) = belX(xq
:
:
yq) implies mqp =
mqq, belY (yp
:
:
xp) = belY (yp
:
:
xq) implies mpp = mqp.
Hence both are independent only if
Y
X {yp} {yq}
X {xp} m m
{xq} m m
(m - a constant equal 1/4).
That is cognitive independence of Smets does not cover statistical inde-
pendence for bayesian belief functions, but rather is a very special case of it
(for uniform distributions).
Let us consider now three variables X, Y,Θ for conditional independence
of X,Y on Θ. Let X,Y have domains as above, let Θ = {θp, θq}. Let the joint
belief distribution basic belief assignment be as follows:
for θp
Y
X {yp} {yq}
X {xp} mppp mpqp
{xq} mqpp mqqp
for θq
Y
X {yp} {yq}
X {xp} mppq mpqq
{xq} mqpq mqqq
When may X and Y be conditionally independent given Θ ? Smets re-
quires that among others
mΘ(θp
:
:
xp, yp) = mΘ(θp
:
:
xp) ·mΘ(θp
:
:
yp)
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mΘ(θp
:
:
xp, yq) = mΘ(θp
:
:
xp) ·mΘ(θp
:
:
yp)
mΘ(θp
:
:
xq, yp) = mΘ(θp
:
:
xq) ·mΘ(θp
:
:
yp)
mΘ(θp
:
:
xq, yq) = mΘ(θp
:
:
xq) ·mΘ(θp
:
:
yq)
mΘ(θq
:
:
xp, yp) = mΘ(θq
:
:
xp) ·mΘ(θq
:
:
yp)
mΘ(θq
:
:
xp, yq) = mΘ(θq
:
:
xp) ·mΘ(θq
:
:
yq)
mΘ(θq
:
:
xp, yp) = mΘ(θq
:
:
xq) ·mΘ(θq
:
:
yp)
mΘ(θq
:
:
xp, yq) = mΘ(θq
:
:
xq) ·mΘ(θq
:
:
yq)
One can easily check that for bayesian belief functions bel(B ∪ A) =
bel(B ∩ A) + bel(A). Then bel(B :
:
A) = bel(B ∩ A). But bel(B ∩ A) is the
sum of m-function values for all singleton subsets of B ∩A.
This actually means that:
mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) = (mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq))·
·(mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp))
etc. Hence
mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) = mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp)
2+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) + ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp)
etc. Hence
mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp)+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp)+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yq) =
= mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp)
2 +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) + ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)
2 +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq) ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp)+
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+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq) + ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yq)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp)
2 +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp) ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp) + ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yq)
2 +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yq) ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yq) + ·mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)
Hence
mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp) +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yq) =
= (mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yp) +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xp, yq)+
+mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yp) +mΘ×X×Y (θp, xq, yq))
2
That is belΘ×X×Y (θp) = belΘ×X×Y (θp)
2. Shall we take seriously the as-
sumption from page that
∑
A⊆Ωm(A) = 1, then either belΘ×X×Y (θp) = 1
and belΘ×X×Y (θq) = 0 or belΘ×X×Y (θp) = 0 and belΘ×X×Y (θq) = 1. But this
actually means that variable Θ does not influence the joint distribution of
X,Y at all. Just the notion of conditional independence for bayesian belief
networks of Smets is devoid of any meaning.
4 Hypergraphs of Shenoy and Shafer
In [9], Shenoy and Shafer proposed a general framework for uncertainty prop-
agation if uncertainty is structured along a hypergraph. Their framework
covers both probability and belief functions.
Hypergraphs: A nonempty set H of nonempty subsets of a finite set S be
called a hypergraph on S. The elements of H be called hyperedges. Elements
of S be called vertices. H and H’ be both hypergraphs on S, then we call
a hypergraph H’ a reduced hypergraph of the hypergraph H, iff for every
h′ ∈ H ′ also h′ ∈ H holds, and for every h ∈ H there exists such a h′ ∈ H ′
that h ⊆ h′.A hypergraph H covers a hypergraph H’ iff for every h′ ∈ H ′
there exists such a h ∈ H that h′ ⊆ h.
Hypertrees: t and b be distinct hyperedges in a hypergraph H, t ∩ b 6= ∅,
and b contains every vertex of t that is contained in a hyperedge of H other
than t; if X ∈ t and X ∈ h, where h ∈ H and h 6= t, then X ∈ b. Then
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we call t a twig of H, and we call b a branch for t. A twig may have more
than one branch. We call a hypergraph a hypertree if there is an ordering
of its hyperedges, say h1, h2, ..., hn such that hk is a twig in the hypergraph
{h1,h 2, ..., hk} whenever 2 ≤ k ≤ n. We call any such ordering of hyperedges
a hypertree construction sequence for the hypertree. The first hyperedge
in the hypertree construction sequence be called the root of the hypertree
construction sequence.
Please refer to the paper of Shenoy and Shafer [9] on notions of Markov
trees, variables (V), valuations (VV), valuations on a set of variables h (V Vh),
and proper valuations, combination operator ⊕ : V V ×V V → V V , marginal-
ization operator ↓ h :
⋃
{V Vg|g ⊆ h} → V Vh, the axiomatic framework and
the local computation method of Shenoy and Shafer. We recall here only the
definitions of:
Factorization: Suppose A is a valuation on a finite set of variables V ,
and suppose HV is a hypergraph on V . If A is equal to the combination of
valuations of all hyperedges h of HV then we say that A factors on HV.
The valuation for MTE is simply the belief function. For MTE the fact
that a belief function Bel defined for the set of variables V factors over a
hypergraph HV means that it may be represented as
Bel =
⊕
h;h∈HV
Belh
where Belh is a (different) belief function defined over the set of variables h.
Conditioning: Suppose Bel is a belief distribution, and BelE is an indica-
tor potential capturing the evidence E (that is BelE is such a belief function
that ME(E) = 1 and for any A different from E m(A)=0). Then condi-
tional belief function conditioned on E, Bel(.||E), is defined as Bel(.||E) =
Bel ⊕BelE .
Actually the propagation of belief in the hypergraph via Shenoy/Shafer
propagation of uncertainty means for a given hypothesis variable Vi calcula-
tion ofBel(.||E)↓Vi (↓ Vi means projection of belief function onto the subspace
of the single variable Vi) for the given belief function Bel, the factorization
of which along a hypergraph is known, and for the evidence E in such a way
as to avoid the calculation of the complete function Bel and Bell(.||E) as a
in-between result - because both functions may consume too much memory.
To manage it, the underlying hypergraph is first transformed to a hypertree
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and thereafter the computations are quick.
Shenoy and Shafer consider it unimportant whether or not the factors
Belh factorization of Bel should refer to any notion of conditionality. In
fact, one may easily construct a belief function factorization in which no
proper subset of factors can tell anything about marginal distribution of any
variable belonging to the factors of this subset.
The hypergraph makes the impression of apparent grater generality than
bayesian networks of Pearl [5] because in case of bayesian belief functions
simpler factorization is possible (less factors, fewer variables) than that along
a bayesian network. However, in [4] it has been shown that this is only a
superficial effect because the real propagation is run on hypertrees, and not
in general type hypergraphs, and then the generality of Shenoy & Shafer
factorization gives nothing beyond that of bayesian network factorization
(see also below).
5 Cano’s et al. A Priori Conditionals in Di-
rected Acyclic Graphs
Cano et al. in [1] proposed a generalization of Pearl’s bayesian networks to
capture DS belief distributions instead of Shenoy/Shafer hypergraphs. They
argue: ”graphical structures used to represent relationships among variables
in our work are Pearl’s causal networks [5], not Shenoy/Shafer’s hypergraphs,
because the former are more appropriate to represent independence relation-
ships among variables in a direct way.” (p.257). On page 262 (Definition 2)
they define a belief function Bel (a priori) conditional belief function condi-
tioned on variable set h by requiring Bel↓h to be a vacuous belief function.
It is easily checked that this notion of conditional belief functions allows to
represent statistically conditionally independent variables of a bayesian be-
lief network as a priori conditionally independent variables in Cano’s et al.
sense.
However, it cannot handle other belief functions which could be expressed
in terms of a Dempster Rule of Combination.
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As an example please verify, that the belief function Bel12
Bel12 = Bel1 ⊕Bel2
with focal points for Bel1, Bel2 (Bel1 defined for variables X,Y, Bel2 for
variables X,Z, domains of variables: X: {x1, x2}, Y: {y1, y2}, Z: {z1, z2})
set m1(set)
{(x1, y1), (x1, y2),
(x2, y1), (x2, y2)} 0.1
{(x1, y1)} 0.2
{(x1, y2)} 0.25
{(x2, y1)} 0.3
{(x2, y2)} 0.15
set m2(set)
{(x1, z1), (x1, z2),
(x2, z1), (x2, z2)} 0.2
{(x1, z1)} 0.2
{(x1, z2)} 0.3
{(x2, z1)} 0.25
{(x2, z2)} 0.05
cannot be represented in a structured manner as a product of a normal and
conditional belief function in sense of Cano et al. In this sense it is im-
mediately visible, that Shenoy-Shafer hypergraphs allow for more efficient
structuring of belief functions than Cano’s et al. directed acyclic graph rep-
resentation.
6 Generalized belief networks
The axiomatization system of Shenoy/Shafer refers to the notion of factoriza-
tion along a hypergraph. However, the actual propagation algorithm operates
on hypertrees. We investigate below implications of this disagreement
Definition 1 [4] We define a mapping ⊖ : V V × V V → V V called decom-
bination such that: if Bel12 = Bel1 ⊖Bel2 then Bel1 = Bel2 ⊕Bel12.
In case of probabilities, decombination means memberwise division: Pr12(A) =
Pr1(A)/Pr2(A). In case of DS pseudo-belief functions it means the opera-
tor ⊖ yielding a DS pseudo-belief function such that: whenever Bel12 =
Bel1 ⊖ Bel2 then Q12(A) = c · Q1/Q2. Both for probabilities and for DS
belief functions decombination may be not uniquely determined. Moreover,
for DS belief functions not always a decombined DS belief function will exist.
Hence we extend the domain to DS pseudo-belief functions which is closed
under this operator. We claim here without a proof (which is simple) that
STRUCTURE OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 14
DS pseudo-belief functions fit the axiomatic framework of Shenoy/Shafer.
Moreover, we claim that if an (ordinary) DS belief function is represented
by a factorization in DS pseudo-belief functions, then any propagation of
uncertainty yields the very same results as when it would have been factored
into ordinary DS belief functions.
Definition 2 [4] By anti-conditioning | of a belief function Bel on a set of
variables h we understand the transformation: Bel|h = Bel ⊖ Bel↓h.
Notably, anti-conditioning means in case of probability functions proper con-
ditioning. Notice that due to the fact that ⊖ does not provide with a unique
result, so also anti-conditioning may yield many pseudo-belief functions none
of which is particularly distinguished. Let us define now the general notion
of belief networks.:
Definition 3 [4] A belief network is a pair (D,Bel) where D is a DAG (di-
rected acyclic graph) and Bel is a belief distribution called the underlying dis-
tribution. Each node i in D corresponds to a variable Xi in Bel, a set of nodes
I corresponds to a set of variables XI and xi, xI denote values drawn from
the domain of Xi and from the (cross product) domain of XI respectively.
Each node in the network is regarded as a storage cell for any distribution
Bel↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i) where Xpi(i) is a set of nodes corresponding to the parent
nodes pi(i) of i. The underlying distribution represented by a belief network
is computed via:
Bel =
n⊕
i=1
Bel↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i)
Please notice the local character of valuation of a node: to valuate the node
i corresponding to variable Xi only the marginal Bel
↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i) needs to be
known (e.g. from data) and not the entire belief distribution.
There exists a straight forward transformation of a belief network struc-
ture into a hypergraph, and hence of a belief network into a hypergraph: for
every node i of the underlying DAG define a hyperedge as the set {Xi}∪Xpi(i);
then the valuation of this hyperedge define as Bel↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i). We say that
the hypergraph obtained in this way is induced by the belief network
Let us consider now the inverse operation: transformation of a valuated
hypergraph into a belief network. As the first stage we consider structures of a
hypergraph and of a belief network (the underlying DAG). we say that a belief
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a)
✉
A
✉
B
✉
C
✉
D
✉
E
b)
✉
A
✉
B
✉
C
✉
D
✉
F
✉
E
Figure 1: An example of hypergraphs a) with b) without compatible belief
network
network is compatible with a hypergraph iff the reduced set of hyperedges
induced by the belief network is identical with the reduced hypergraph.
Example 1 Let us consider the following hypergraph (see Fig.1.a)): {{A,B,C},
{C,D}, {D,E}, {A, E}}. the following belief network structures are compat-
ible with this hypergraph: {A,C → B, C → D, D → E, E → A} (see
Fig.2.a)), {A,C → B, D → C, D → E, E → A}, (see Fig.2.b)), {A,C → B,
D → C, E → D, E → A}, (see Fig.2.c)), {A,C → B, D → C, E → D,
A→ E}. (see Fig.2.d)), ✸
Example 2 Let us consider the following hypergraph (see Fig.1.b)): {{A,B,C},
{C,D}, {D,E}, {A, E}, {B,F}, {F,D}}. No belief network structure is com-
patible with it. ✸
The missing compatibility is connected with the fact that a hypergraph may
represent a cyclic graph. Even if a compatible belief network has been found
we may have troubles with valuations. In Example 1 an unfriendly valuation
of hyperedge {A,C,B} may require an edge AC in a belief network represent-
ing the same distribution, but it will make the hypergraph incompatible (as
e.g. hyperedge {A,C,E} would be induced). This may be demonstrated as
follows:
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a)
✉
A
✉
B
✉
C
✉
D
✉
E
 
  ✒
❅
❅❅■
❄✛
✻
b)
✉
A
✉
B
✉
C
✉
D
✉
E
 
  ✒
❅
❅❅■
✻
✛
✻
c)
✉
A
✉
B
✉
C
✉
D
✉
E
 
  ✒
❅
❅❅■
✻
✲
✻
d)
✉
A
✉
B
✉
C
✉
D
✉
E
 
  ✒
❅
❅❅■
✻
✲❄
Figure 2: An example of belief networks corresponding to a hypergraph from
Fig. 1.a)
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Definition 4 [4] If XJ , XK , XL are three disjoint sets of variables of a dis-
tribution Bel, then XJ , XK are said to be conditionally independent given XL
(denoted I(XJ , XK |XL)Bel) iff
Bel↓XJ∪XK∪XL|XL ⊕Bel↓XL = Bel↓XJ∪XL|XL ⊕ Bel↓XK∪XL|XL ⊕ Bel↓XL
I(XJ , XK |XL)Bel is called a conditional independence statement
Let I(J,K|L)D denote d-separation in a graph [3].:
THEOREM 1 [4] Let BelD = {Bel|(D,Bel) be a belief network}. Then:
I(J,K|L)D iff I(XJ , XK |XL)Bel for all Bel ∈ BelD.
Now we see in the above example that nodes D and E d-separate nodes A
and C. Hence within any belief network based on one of the three DAGs
mentioned A will be conditionally independent from C given D and E. But
one can easily check that with general type of hypergraph valuation nodes A
and C may be rendered dependent. The sad result is, that
THEOREM 2 [4] Hypergraphs considered by Shenoy/Shafer [9] may for a
given joint belief distribution have simpler structure than (be properly covered
by) the closest hypergraph induced by a belief network.
Notably, though the axiomatic system of Shenoy/Shafer refers to hypergraph
factorization of a joint belief distribution, the actual propagation is run on
a hypertree (or more precisely, on one construction sequence of a hypertree,
that is on Markov tree) covering that hypergraph. Let us look closer at the
outcome of the process of covering with a reduced hypertree factorization,
or more precisely, at the relationship of a hypertree construction sequence
and a belief network constructed out of it in the following way:If hk is a
twig in the sequence {h1, ..., hk} and hik its branch with ik < k, then let us
span the following directed edges in a belief network: First make a complete
directed acyclic graph out of nodes hk − hik . Then add edges Yl → Xj for
every Yl ∈ hk ∩ hik and every Xj ∈ hk − hik . (see Fig.3). Repeat this for
every k=2,..,n. For k=1 proceed as if h1 were a twig with an empty set as
a branch for it.
It is easily checked that the hypergraph induced by a belief network struc-
ture obtained in this way is in fact a hypertree (if reduced, then exactly
the original reduced hypertree). Let us turn now to valuations (Fig.4.a).
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a)
✉
Y1
✉
Y2
✉
Y3
✉
X1
✉
X2
twig
branch
❡
❡
b)
✉
Y1
✉
Y2
✉
Y3
✉
X1
✉
X2
✲
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✕
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❑
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗❦
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✸
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✕
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❑
Figure 3: An example of a) a twig in hypertree and b) its fragment of belief
network
Let Beli be the valuation originally attached to the hyperedge hi. then
Bel = Bel1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Beln. What conditional belief is to be attached to
hn ? First marginalize: Bel
′
n = Bel
↓h1∩hn
1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Bel
↓hn−1∩hn
n−1 ⊕ Beln. (
(Fig.4.b,.c)) Now calculate: Bel”n = Bel
′|hn∩hin
n , and Bel”
′
n = Bel
′↓hn∩hin
n .
Let Bel∗k = Belk ⊖ Bel
↓h1∩hn
k for k=1,...,in-1,in+1,...,(n-1), (Fig.4.d) and
let Bel∗in = (Belin ⊖ Bel
↓h1∩hn
in
) ⊕ Bel”′n . Obviously, Bel = Bel∗1 ⊕ . . . ⊕
Bel∗(n−1) ⊕ Bel”n (Fig.4.e). Now let us consider a new hypertree only with
hyperedges h1, . . . hn−1, and with valuations equal to those marked with as-
terisk (*), and repeat the process until only one hyperedge is left, the now
valuation of which is considered as Bel”1. In the process, a new factorization
is obtained: Bel = Bel”1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Bel”n.
If now for a hyperedge hk card(hk − hik) = 1, then we assign Bel”k to
the node of the belief network corresponding to hk − hik . If for a hyper-
edge hk card(hk − hik) > 1, then we split Bel”k as follows: Let hk − hik =
{Xk1, Xk2, ...., Xkm} and the indices shall correspond to the order in the belief
network induced by the above construction procedure. Then
Bel”k = Bel
↓hk |hk∩hik =
m⊕
j=1
Bel↓(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}|(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}−{Xkj}
and we assign valuation Bel↓(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}|(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}−{Xkj} to
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a)
✉
Y1
✉
Y2
✉
Y3
✉
X1
✉
X2
twig: Belt
branch: Belb
❡
❡
other hyperedge: Belo
❡
❡
b)
✉
Y1
✉
Y2
✉
Y3
✉
X1
✉
X2
twig: Belt
branch: (Belb ⊖Bel
↓t∩b
b )⊕ Bel
↓t∩b
b
❡
❡
other hyperedge: (Belo ⊖ Bel
↓t∩b∩o
o )⊕Bel
↓t∩b∩o
o
❡
❡
c)
✉
Y1
✉
Y2
✉
Y3
✉
X1
✉
X2
twig: Bel′t = Belt ⊕ Bel
↓t∩b
b ⊕Bel
↓t∩b∩o
o
branch: Belb ⊖ Bel
↓t∩b
b
❡
❡
other hyperedge: Belo ⊖ Bel
↓t∩b∩o
o
❡
❡
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d)
✉
Y1
✉
Y2
✉
Y3
✉
X1
✉
X2
twig: Bel′|t∩bt ⊕ Bel
′↓t∩b
t
branch: Belb ⊖Bel
↓t∩b
b
❡
❡
other hyperedge: Belo ⊖ Bel
↓t∩b∩o
o
❡
❡
e)
✉
Y1
✉
Y2
✉
Y3
✉
X1
✉
X2
twig: Bel′|t∩bt
branch: (Belb ⊖Bel
↓t∩b
b )⊕ Bel
′↓t∩b
t
❡
❡
other hyperedge: Belo ⊖ Bel
↓t∩b∩o
o
❡
❡
Figure 4: An example of valuation transformation
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the node corresponding to Xkj in the network structure. It is easily checked
that:
THEOREM 3 [4] (i) The network obtained by the above construction of
its structure and valuation from hypertree factorization is a belief network.
(ii) This belief network represents exactly the joint belief distribution of the
hypertree
(iii) This belief network induces exactly the original reduced hypertree struc-
ture
The above theorem implies that any hypergraph suitable for propagation
must have a compatible belief network. Hence seeking for belief network
decompositions of joint belief distributions is sufficient for finding any fac-
torization suitable for Shenoy/Shafer propagation of uncertainty.
7 Discussion
We presented here selected concepts of structuring of DS belief functions
with a special emphasis on their capability to capture independence from
the point of view of the claim that belief functions generalize bayes notion
of probability.
It is demonstrated that Zhu and Lee’s [12] logical networks and Smets’ [11]
directed acyclic graphs are unable to capture statistical dependence/independence
of bayesian networks [5].Zhu and Lee’s [12] just assume conditional indepen-
dence of premise and conclusion of an implication and hence assume that the
dominant value of premise implies the dominant value of conclusion. This is
wrong from the logical point of view because the implication may be inverse
in the data, but the presence of cases for which the rule is not applicable
will distort the conclusions of expert system based on rules like those pro-
posed by Zhu and Lee’s [12]. Smets [11] goes to other extreme and assumes
that all variables but in very restricted cases are dependent. His definition
of cognitive independence applies to bayesian belief functions only in those
rare cases of uniform joint probability distribution. Smets’ notion of condi-
tional independence for bayesian belief functions means that the conditioning
variable is degenerate from statostical point of view: it takes only one value
and hence is usually ommitted from any statistical analysis. So conditional
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independence again reduces to uniform distribution of conditioned variables.
On the other hand, though Shenoy and Shafer’s hypergraphs can ex-
plicitly represent bayesian network factorization of bayesian belief functions,
they disclaim any need for representation of independence of variables in
belief functions. Cano et al. [1] reject the hypergraph representation of
Shenoy and Shafer just on grounds of missing representation of variable in-
dependence, but in their frameworks some belief functions factorizable in
Shenoy/Shafer framework cannot be factored. The approach in [4] on the
other hand combines the merits of both Cano et al. and of Shenoy/Shafer
approach in that for Shenoy/Shafer approach no simpler factorization than
that in [4] approach exists and on the other hand all independences among
variables captured in Cano et al. framework and many more are captured in
[4] approach.
Two new operators for MTE have been introduced in connection with the
approach of [4]: decombination ⊖ and anti-conditioning |. We shall stress
that operators in this sense have been also introduced previously by Shenoy in
[10] in connection with his valuation networks. We shall emphasize however
one important difference making our approach more general. Shenoy insists
that belief functions suitable for anti-conditioning should have unique unity
item which means that the belief function shall have a focal point equal to the
universe. This excludes bayesian belief functions so that Shenoy’s framework
could not represent many of independences explicated within our framework.
Inversion of Shafer’s conditioning Bel(.||B) was also considered by Cano
et al. [1], Smets [11] and Shafer [6]. The ’a priori conditioning’ of Cano et
al. [1] is a special case of our anti-conditioning in that it requires marginal-
ization on conditioning variables to yield a vacuous belief function. On the
other hand deconditioning of Smets [11] and conditional embedding of Shafer
[6] are entirely different in nature. Our approach starts with joint absolute
belief distribution and tries to remove the impact of absolute distribution
of anti-conditioning variables from the picture of relation between the anti-
conditioning and the anti-conditioned variable. Deconditioning and condi-
tional embedding start with selected conditional beliefs try to establish a
joint absolute belief distribution of conditioned and conditioning variables.
Hence the concept of anti-conditioning is orthogonal to that of conditional
embedding and deconditioning.
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8 Conclusions
For many approaches to structuring of belief functions the claim of gen-
eralization of bayesian probabilities by Dempster-Shafer belief functions is
actually illusive. Especially
• Zhu and Lee’s [12] logical networks and Smets’ [11] directed acyclic
graphs are unable to capture statistical dependence/independence of
bayesian networks
• Though Shenoy and Shafer’s hypergraphs can explicitly represent bayesian
network factorization of bayesian belief functions, they disclaim any
need for representation of independence of variables in belief functions.
• In Cano et al. [1] frameworks some belief functions factorizable in
Shenoy/Shafer framework cannot be factored.
• The approach in [4] on the other hand combines the merits of both
Cano et al. (representation of independences) and of Shenoy/Shafer
approach (Shenoy/Shafer approach yields no simpler factorization than
that in [4] approach)
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Appendix: Basic Definitions of MTE
Definition 5 Let Ξ be a finite set of elements called elementary events. Any
subset of Ξ be a composite event. Ξ be called also the frame of discernment.
A basic probability assignment function m:2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A∈2Ξ
|m(A)| = 1
m(∅) = 0
∀A∈2Ξ 0 ≤
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
(|.| - absolute value.
A belief function be defined as Bel:2Ξ → [0, 1] so that
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B)
A plausibility function be Pl:2Ξ → [0, 1] with
∀A∈2Ξ P l(A) = 1−Bel(Ξ− A)
A commonalty function be Q:2Ξ → [0, 1] with
∀A∈2Ξ Q(A) =
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
For a belief function, any set A such that m(A) differs from zero, is called
focal point. A belief function where every focal point is a set with cardinality
1 (singleton) is called bayesian belief function.
Furthermore, a Rule of Combination of two Independent Belief Functions
Bel1, Bel2 Over the Same Frame of Discernment (the so-called Dempster-
Rule), denoted
BelE1,E2 = BelE1 ⊕BelE2
is defined as follows: :
mE1,E2(A) = c ·
∑
B,C;A=B∩C
mE1(B) ·mE2(C)
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(c - constant normalizing the sum of |m| to 1)
Furthermore, let the frame of discernment Ξ be structured in that it is
identical to cross product of domains Ξ1, Ξ2, . . . Ξn of n discrete variables
X1, X2, . . .Xn, which span the space Ξ. Let (x1, x2, . . . xn) be a vector in
the space spanned by the variables X1, , X2, . . .Xn. Its projection onto the
subspace spanned by variables Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk (j1, j2, . . . jk distinct indices
from the set 1,2,. . . ,n) is then the vector (xj1 , xj2 , . . . xjk). (x1, x2, . . . xn) is
also called an extension of (xj1 , xj2, . . . xjk). A projection of a set A of such
vectors is the set A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk of projections of all individual vectors from
A onto Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk . A is also called an extension of A
↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk . A
is called the vacuous extension of A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk iff A contains all possible
extensions of each individual vector in A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk . The fact, that A
is a vacuous extension of B onto space X1, X2, . . . Xn is denoted by A =
B↑X1,X2,...Xn
Definition 6 Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space
of discernment spanned by variables X1, X2, . . . Xn. m
↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk is called
the projection of m onto subspace spanned by Xj1 , Xj2, . . .Xjk iff
m↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk (B) = c ·
∑
A;B=A
↓Xj1
,Xj2
,...Xjk
m(A)
(c - normalizing factor)
Definition 7 Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space
of discernment spanned by variables Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk . m
↑X1,X2,...Xn is called
the vacuous extension of m onto superspace spanned by X1, X2, . . . Xn iff
m↑X1,X2,...Xn(B↑X1,X2,...Xn) = m(B)
and m↑X1,X2,...Xn(A) = 0 for any other A.
We say that a belief function is vacuous iff m(Ξ) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for any
A different from Ξ.
Projections and vacuous extensions of Bel, Pl and Q functions are defined
with respect to operations on m function. Notice that by convention if we
want to combine by Dempster rule two belief functions not sharing the frame
of discernment, we look for the closest common vacuous extension of their
frames of discernment without explicitly notifying it.
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Definition 8 (See [7]) Let B be a subset of Ξ, called evidence, mB be a
basic probability assignment such that mB(B) = 1 and mB(A) = 0 for any A
different from B. Then the conditional belief function Bel(.||B) representing
the belief function Bel conditioned on evidence B is defined as: Bel(.||B) =
Bel ⊕BelB.
Notice: Vacuous extension is also called cylindric extension. In Smets’
interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory names bel, pl and q are used instead
of Bel, Pl and Q. The justification is that Smets allows for ∅ to be a focal
point (open world assumption).
In this paper, the notion of pseudo-belief functions is also used (last
section before discussion). A pseudo-belief function differs from proper belief
function in that m is allowed to take also negative values, but only in such
a way as to ensure that Q remains non-negative. However, Bel and Pl may
get negative for pseudo-belief functions.
